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  Abstract
This contribution has the objective to reflect on existing and 
impending challenges to EU public law from an administrative perspective. This 
will be undertaken against the fast-paced developments of the past 50 years link-
ing various levels of government and administration in the Member States and 
the EU to administrative networks which are active also on the international 
scene. In this context, European administrative law has grown and evolved and 
has become an important, yet often not very fully understood, factor shaping the 
reality of policy implementation in the EU. 
 1  An Administrative Perspective on EU Law – 
Changing Perspectives of EU Administrative Law
European integration through law is highly dynamic pro-
cess. This paper makes an attempt to contribute to the thinking about EU 
public law by contextualising and giving an overview of some of the central 
aspects of the evolving scholarship necessary to tackle the challenges to the 
EU’s future as a legal system from an administrative law perspective. 
After an initial flourishing in legal literature and case law in the found-
ing period of the European integration process, especially in the context of 
the ECSC, administrative law virtually disappeared from the horizon of EU 
legal scholars. The initial administrative perspective on European integra-
tion was a rather restricted and even tendentious one. In the context of 
the original EEC it was often associated more with the aim of denying the 
‘state’ quality of the E(E)C than of attempting to encompass the real nature 
of legal relations within the early European Communities. The disappear-
ance of this administrative perspective can be largely traced to the interest 
  herwig.hofmann@uni.lu This paper is a footnoted version of a presentation I gave at the 
First REALaw research conference in Groningen on June 3, 009. I would like to especially 
thank Gerard Rowe for investing much of his time into developing and clarifying the ideas 
contained in this article. Many others have generously contributed their time to discussing 
the ideas therein. 
  This came to be known under the idea of the Communities being the Member States’ 
special purpose vehicle or ‚Zweckverband’ for achieving certain limited policy goals. See for 
example H.P. Ipsen, Zur Exekutivrechtsetzung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: P. 
Badura, R. Scholz (eds.), Wege und Verfahren des Verfassungslebens (Beck Verlag, München, 
993), 45-44. 
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in the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the E(E)C legal system. ‘Constitutionalists’ 
provided for a change of focus looking at the specific nature of the E(E)C 
and later the EU in relation to the Member State legal orders and the role 
of the individual vis-à-vis the various levels.3 This often resulted in a multi-
level understanding of the EU inspired by federal structures. A simplified 
version of such an approach might read as follows: Member States delegate 
certain rule-making powers to the EU which the latter exercises according 
to pre-defined procedures and types of regulatory action. These regulatory 
actions emanating from the European level are in turn implemented by the 
Member States.4 Additionally, this vision of EU law saw the EU having the 
power to act externally within a system of public international law. Under 
such a model, disputes between the different levels could be solved through 
complex ‘conflict of laws’ arrangements establishing the relation between 
EU law and national law as well as the relation between public international 
law and the law of the EU. Such federal-constitutionalist thinking carries, in 
my view, the risk of developing a mental picture involving clear delegations 
and separations of layers or levels.
Therefore, I suggest to turn to a much more messy but perhaps more 
realistic and thereby more powerful perspective. The idea is to find a model, 
or models, which is, or are, structured to address the reality of legal relations 
and adapted to the complexity of EU public law arrangements. This makes 
a look at EU public law from an administrative perspective seem to be a 
rewarding exercise, albeit one significantly different from the early percep-
tion of the nineteen fifties. Such an administrative law perspective paints a 
rather different picture from a more ‘traditional’ constitutional perspective 
on EU public law. 
One difficulty, though, in adopting an administrative perspective on EU 
public law lies in finding a workable definition of ‘administrative’. European 
administrative law has grown and evolved becoming an important, yet often 
not very fully understood, factor shaping the reality of policy implementation 
in the EU. For the purpose of argument, I propose to define EU administra-
3  M. P. Chiti, Forms of European Administrative Action, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 
[004], 37-60.
4  Implementation on the European level through direct administration was under this 
model the exception to indirect administration by the Member States. This model is often 
referred to as ‘executive federalism’. See for the description of the classic model of executive 
federalism e.g. K. Lenaerts, Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European 
Community, 8 CMLRev [99], -35 at  et seq.; B. Dubey, Administration indirecte et 
fédéralisme d’exécution en Europe, [003] CDE, 87-33. For a view, which emphasises the 
co-operative nature of executive federalism. see e.g. P. Dann, European Parliament and 
Executive Federalism: Approaching a Parliament in a Semi-Parliament Democracy’,  
European Law Journal [003] 549-574.
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tive law by reference to three broad elements, namely ‘functional’, ‘organisa-
tional’ and ‘procedural’.5 
The functional aspect of administration addresses the totality of the tasks 
of administrative actors, no matter who undertakes them and how they are 
conducted. In the EU, administrative functions consist of a vast array of 
activities, geared towards fulfilling EU policy objectives.6 Functions range 
from single case decisions and preparatory acts thereof, at one end of the 
spectrum, to the creation of delegated legislation and the amendment of 
basic acts and their enforcement, at the other end. They thereby cover a 
wide range of activities going far beyond the merely technical regulation 
of the internal market.7 Closely related to the functional dimension of 
5  This definitional approach is used here instead of the more common distinction between 
administrative/technical matters on one hand and political matters on the other. The 
approach here recommends itself due to the fact that, in the EU, administrative functions 
in fact often have a distinctly political character. This has a reason not least in the dearth 
of political in the sense of a party political policy-debate-centred culture on the level of 
rule-making procedures in the EU and a pre-dominance of expert driven and consensus 
models. This however also indicates that administrations need to be held and can be held 
accountable on their own account beyond classical parliamentary, hierarchic Weberian-style 
models.
6  EU administrative law thus contains rules and principles governing the exercise of admin-
istrative functions with relation to the creation and implementation of EU law. There is, 
however, a remarkable lack of specification of administrative tasks in the founding treaties 
from which the functional tasks can rather be deduced rather than merely illustrated. 
Treaty norms more specifically concerning administrative powers can be found in certain 
policy areas such as those on agriculture, antitrust, state aid and monetary policy. Some 
general provisions can be found in the delegation provisions in Articles 89, 90 and 9 
TFEU (Article 0 third indent and Article  EC). 
7  The tasks therefore include inter alia planning of joint actions and framework plans (such 
as for example in environmental law the flora fauna habitat plans, or the ozone plans or 
even more complex, the setting up of pollution rights under certain trading schemes for 
pollution). They also include regulatory activities such as administrative rule-making with 
an effect to the outside. Equally administrative rule-making amounts to the interpreta-
tion and further specification of conditions for implementation of legislative provisions. 
Administrative tasks also encompass taking of single case decisions (such as for example with 
respect to merger control, anti-dumping measures, the compatibitity of state aid provisions 
with the common market, the legality of certain business arrangements in light of Articles 
8 and 8 EC). They further include making of recommendations, opinions and reports (where 
so required by legislation or where there is a legal basis to do so) as well as coordination and 
supervision of private actors involved in administrative activities such as standard setting 
and normatisation. Coordination tasks also extend to coordination of networks of administra-
tion for implementation of EU policies (often found in the context of risk regulation such 
as for example in the networks created around the marine safety agency. It is also an activ-
40
hofmann
administration, are also organisational and procedural dimensions. From an 
organisational perspective, there is a great complexity of actors and actor-
constellations involved in exercising the administrative function of imple-
menting EU law. Many administrative tasks are fulfilled by Member States’ 
institutions and bodies which, in exercise of these tasks, enjoy limited 
institutional or procedural autonomy.8 When exercised on the European 
level, executive authority is spread across several institutions, most notably 
the Commission and the Council,9 which are now increasingly supported 
ity which plays an increasing role in the grey zone between the pillars of the EU such as 
immigration and border security. It finally is an activity which plays a role in the context of 
international regulatory cooperation towards actors outside the EU). Administrations also 
fulfil supervisory functions (as for example the supervision by the Commission of Member 
State implementing measures or spending decisions of EU funds). In certain cases they 
also include redistributive disbursement of funds (for example in the area of distribution of 
subsidies for agriculture, research or development aid and emergency aid). This often takes 
place in cooperation between EU actors as well as public and private actors in the Member 
States. Important are further information management (for example in the form of publica-
tion of data as well as the establishment and sharing of data in common data networks or 
through mutual assistance arrangements). 
8  See originally formulated in Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz EG v. Landwirtschafts-Kammer 
für das Saarland [976] ECR 989, para 5. Limitations of the Member States’ autonomy 
arise from the fact that Member States’ substantive and procedural administrative law 
is applicable only within the framework of EU/EC law. The framework is set by basically 
three factors. First, Member States substantive and procedural law is applicable only in 
the absence of any explicit provisions of Community law requiring the adoption of either 
specific procedures or institutional organization of the Member States administrative 
structures. Second, the application of procedural rules of Member States for application of 
Community law needs to be exercised in strict compliance with the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness. The principle of equivalence requires that national arrangements for the 
implementation of Community law ‘are not less favourable than those governing simi-
lar domestic actions’ and the principle of effectiveness requires that the Member States’ 
arrangements ‘do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of 
rights conferred by Community law.’ See: Case C-6/95 Palmisani [997] ECR I-405, para 
7; C-453/99 Courage [00] ECR I-697, para 5.
9  It is important to note that due to the former pillar structure of the EU, not only the 
Commission, traditionally the centre of the European-level executive, but also the Council 
and specifically its General Secretariat with the help of Council working parties and co-
coordinating committees were developing as an executive centre for certain policy areas. 
Beyond the traditional possibility of retaining certain executive decisions under Article 0 
third indent EC, the latter developed and increasingly implemented policies to implement 
joint positions and action plans in the areas of the CFSP and CJHA matters. But also in the 
areas of the EMU, the Council’s Eurogroup had created important administrative tasks for 
the Council. See for an overview e.g. T. Christiansen and S. Vanhoonacker, At a Critical 
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by EU agencies. Further, executive functions exercised on the EU level are 
almost always undertaken in cooperation with administrative actors from 
the Member States and private parties, and in some policy areas within 
networks which included participants from outside the EU.
The organisational separation between EU and Member State admin-
istration, however, does not stand in the way of forms of procedural coop-
eration. Such cooperation of organizationally separate actors carrying out 
administrative functions leads often to a network structure involving a 
diversity of actors.0 Most forms of procedural cooperation of this kind are 
based on information exchange and the joint gathering and/or generation 
of information. Such procedures vary according to the level of detail the 
subject of a regulatory administrative measure, for example, depending 
upon whether it will result in administrative rule-making or single case 
decision making. Such procedures also vary considerably from one policy 
area to another. Procedural cooperation leads increasingly to joint plan-
ning networks for which EU law provides the framework of the actions of 
the Commission (and sometimes European agencies) together with national 
Juncture? Change and Continuity in the Institutional Development of the Council Secre-
tariat, 3 West European Politics [008] 75-770. 
0  Structures to coordinate actors include comitology committees for development and coordi-
nation of implementation of EU law between Member States and the Commission, as well 
as agencies fulfilling special tasks of network administration. 
  In practice, these forms of cooperation consist of obligations of different intensity. They 
can consist of either ad-hoc or a permanent exchanges. Ad-hoc single case related coopera-
tion is mainly to be found in areas where information is gathered and exchanged through 
mutual assistance requirements or systematized reporting duties. Exchange takes place 
vertically and horizontally between the Commission and national as well as European agen-
cies. See e.g. the ‘European Regulators Group’ in the telecommunications sector (Decision 
00/67), the ‘Committee of European Securities Regulators’ in the financial services 
sector (Decision 00/57 [00] OJ L9/43) and the ‘European Competition Network’ 
(Council Regulation /003 [003] OJ L/). Forms of complex administrative coopera-
tion exist with composite procedures (see e.g. H.C.H. Hofmann, Decision Making in EU 
Administrative Law – The Problem of Composite Procedures, 5 Administrative Law Review 
[009] (forthcoming)). 
  Information networks have been established to channel and to co-ordinate the genera-
tion and editing of data relevant to administrative activity. A prominent example of such a 
network is the ‘European Information Observation Network,’ Eionet (Council Regulation 
0/90 of 7 May 990, OJ 990 L 0/ and Council Regulation 933/99 of 9 April 999, 
OJ 999 L 7/, amending Regulation 0/90 on the establishment of the European Envi-
ronment Agency and the European environment information and observation network) of 
public and private actors ‘record, collate and assess data on the state of the environment, to 
draw up expert reports (…), to provide uniform assessment criteria for environmental data 
to be applied in all Member States.’
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authorities.3 Similar developments exist with respect to so called ‘enforce-
ment networks’.4 An array of formal and informal governance structures 
exist in the implementation process for co-ordinating measures of Member 
States or actions between the European and the national level within these 
networks.5 Such network structures cannot be well understood if considered 
only from the standpoint of the organisational separation of, on one hand, 
the EU and, on the other, a Member State as unitary actors with apparently 
competing competences.
This short tour d’horizon of EU administrative law implies the need to 
establish realistic, systematic legal thinking about the multi-dimensional 
nature of a system which combines the particularities of the functional unity 
of administrative tasks undertaken by actors separated organisationally (or 
perhaps structurally) but engaged in often intense procedural cooperation. 
3  The TFEU provides for certain planning competencies in areas such as infrastructure, 
environment, research support, economic and social cohesion or agriculture and fisheries 
policies – to name just a few. The result of all of these planning procedures is that is no 
planning takes place purely on a European level. Instead, Member State authorities always 
participate in the creation and implementation as well as updating of planning activities. 
The coordination of the Member State and the European level takes place through comitol-
ogy procedures, often in addition to a structure of formalised contacts between the agencies 
involved in the different phases of planning procedures. The European Structural funds are 
an exemplary model of coordinated planning structures. Their implementation is charac-
terized by the principle of complementing measures and partnership between different 
local, regional and national actors from the Member States level and the European level 
as well private participants (See Council Regulation (EC) No 60/999 of  June 999 
laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds, OJ 999 L 6/).
4  Examples of the use of network structures with both vertical and horizontal relations have 
increased in recent years. The most publicised example is the modernisation of the enforce-
ment regime for EU competition law under Articles 0 and 0 TFEU  (Articles 8 and 
8 EC) in Regulation /003, which has ended the Commission’s monopoly of granting 
individual exemptions and entrusts the enforcement of the Community’s antitrust rules 
to the Commission, national competition authorities and national courts. This parallel 
form of enforcement requires a high degree of co-ordination, which is pursued within the 
European Competition Network linking the Commission and national competition authori-
ties. Similarly, under the telecommunications ‘framework directive’ (Directive 00/ of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, [00] OJ 08/33) an organisational structure 
is established in which the national regulators are integrated into a unitary administra-
tive structure for the enforcement of Community rules. In addition, the Commission set 
up a ‘European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications Networks and Services’ 
to provide ‘an interface between national regulatory authorities and the Commission’ 
(Commission Decision 00/67, [00] OJ L 00/38). 
5  See e.g. T. Christiansen and S. Piattoni, Informal Governance in the European Union, Elgar 
Publishing (Cheltenham 003).
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The intense procedural cooperation in turn often leads to the creation of new 
organisational forms.6
 2  Challenges from an Administrative Law 
Perspective 
It is especially these particularities of EU administrative law 
that provoke some of the most significant challenges for future development 
of EU public law. Some of these I will briefly outline in the following consid-
erations which I personally find the currently the most challenging. 
In the following, I list seven challenges for EU public law arising from 
those developments.7 I submit that the EU public lawyers need to address 
these in order to contribute to an improvement in the state of law and 
governance in the EU. These seven factors are of course not the only ones. 
But they are definitely challenges which would benefit from a more in-depth 
and probably also comparative analysis.
 .  Allocation of Responsibilities in the EU Administrative 
Networks
What might be identified as a first challenge to EU public 
law from an administrative perspective is the need to develop a proper 
understanding of the realities of organisational separation and procedural 
cooperation within the networks of actors undertaking administrative func-
tions. Achieving such an understanding is no easy feat, for a number of rea-
sons. One reason is that network architectures are generally policy-specific. 
In the EU there is, so far, no general approach spanning various policy areas. 
The various types of information, enforcement and planning networks in 
different policy areas link the administrations of the Member States directly 
with agencies, the Commission and Council. Therefore, any allocation of 
6  For example, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA, estab-
lished by Council Regulation 309/93, [993] OJ 4/) is charged with the co-ordination 
and provision of scientific expertise in the field of medicinal products. Its task is part of an 
administrative process, namely the authorisation of medicinal products, as its Committees 
for Proprietal Medicinal Products and the Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products 
provide scientific opinions, on the basis of which the Commission takes the final decision. 
The agency has been established on the basis of these committees which prior to the crea-
tion of the agency were established under comitology
7  It is entirely up to the reader, if he or she so wishes, to associate the seven challenges 
outlined in this paper with either the seven virtues (chastity, temperance, charity, diligence, 
kindness, patience, and humility) or the seven sins (lust, gluttony, greed, sloth, wrath, envy, 
and pride).
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responsibilities needs to acknowledge that it takes place in the context of a 
highly integrated system. Specifically, this means that Member States and 
the Union as such only exceptionally interact through hierarchical chains, 
links or contacts, for example channelled through governments. Instead, 
interactions take place and responsibilities are allocated and satisfied in the 
context of direct links between EU actors and their Member State counter-
parts together with semi-private and private actors.8 Thus, as actors within 
the Union context, the Member States are ‘disaggregated’.9 This is neither 
negative nor astonishing in a system of shared sovereignty.0 It requires how-
ever, careful analysis of exactly where decisions are taken and thus where 
responsibility ultimately lies. 
The challenge arising from such an assessment is to allocate responsi-
bilities. This involves ‘mapping the locus’ of executive (and by contrast also 
legislative) powers not only with respect to the production of formal EU/EC 
legal acts but also within the (often informal) forms of network coopera-
8  The advantage of hierarchical systems is that responsibilities and control structures are 
more easily attributed to single actors: The disadvantage lies in problems with the flow of 
information and the system’s lack of flexibility. Both advantages and disadvantages of hier-
archical systems are much less pronounced in Europe’s integrated administration, where 
the Member State and Community administrative action are through procedures extremely 
integrated.
9  A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton University Press (Princeton 004), pp. 5, . 
Slaughter, uses this phrase for calling for a conceptual shift in understanding states in the 
international sphere. She asks to ‘Stop imagining the international system as a system of 
states-unitary entities like billiard balls or black boxes-subject to rules created by interna-
tional institutions that are apart from, ‘above’ these states. Start thinking about a world of 
governments – legislation, adjudication, implementation – interacting both with each other 
domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts.’ Her concept is all 
the more applicable in the context of the supranational EU.
0  The evolving reality of integrated administration thus is the story of the development of a 
system of decentralised yet cooperative administrative structures. This development has 
transformed both the European as well as the national legal systems. National administra-
tions had developed under national public law as state-specific structures. These reflected 
different identities, historic traditions of organisation and certain underlying values such as 
regionalisation or centralised unification within a state. The effect of European integration 
has been to open Member States public law systems obliging them to develop administra-
tive institutions, bodies and procedures required for an effective exercise of shared sove-
reignty under the system of EU law.
  F. Bignami, Foreword, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems [004] -0 thus observed that 
decision-making in these contexts is ‘national, transnational, and supranational, all at the 
same time.’ 
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tion. That requires recognising the reality of the forms of EU law which 
have been created in and around those forms which are formally provided 
for or acknowledged in the Treaties. It also requires an understanding of 
the intricacies of the forms employed in the exercise of executive powers in 
the EU. Such understanding is also a pre-condition of designing effective 
accountability mechanisms tailored to fit contemporary Union reality. 
The challenge is, therefore, to comprehend the numerous and varied 
structures of governance and to make them transparent in order to permit 
the effective allocation of indeed political, but especially legal, responsibility. 
Doing so is an essential condition of establishing subsequent supervision 
and achieving accountability of administrative action, a condition for adher-
ing to the rule of law in the exercise of public power. This task is not made 
easy by the diversity in the types of actors and the forms of cooperation in 
existence, including for example the role of private parties in co-regulation 
and rule-making. The satisfaction of this task further needs to take into 
account that, unlike many forms of organisation in ‘traditional’ administra-
tive law, hierarchical structures of control and supervision are not generally 
an organisational feature within the network arrangements referred to here.
 .  Establishing a Coherent Approach to Delegation of 
Implementing Powers 
A second challenge facing EU public law from an administra-
tive perspective is linked to the first dealing with allocation and delegation 
of powers. It addresses two questions. One is which types of act are available 
the public administration, especially after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon. The other is how to deal with comitology and agencies in this 
context. 
With respect to the first aspect of the types of act, a wide variety of types 
of action in the form of both hard and soft law has been created in practice. 
It considers all types of act formally provided for in Article 88 TFEU (and 
formerly Article 49 EC) but also a great amount of atypical types of act. 
These types of act fulfil traditional legislative tasks but also help pursuing 
goals such as planning, network cooperation and others more. The proce-
dures leading to the adoption of an act can be formal and informal; acts can 
be preparatory or final. The addressees of the acts can be both public and 
private actors. 
The Treaty of Lisbon was originally designed as an attempt to simplify the 
typology of acts. It provides that legislative acts (being the outcome of a legis-
lative co-decision procedure resulting in regulations, directives and deci-
sions). Delegation of legislative powers to issue delegated acts ‘to supplement 
  D. Curtin, ‘European Legal Integration: Paradise Lost?’ in: D. Curtin, A. Klip, J. Smits, J. 
McCahery (eds.) European Integration and Law, Intersentia (Antwerpen 006), -54, at p. 35.
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or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act’3 and delega-
tion of implementing powers ‘where uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed’4 is possible under Article 88-9 
TFEU. Delegated and implementing regulations can be issued as direc-
tives or decisions. Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon provides for three types 
of legislative acts and six different categories of formally non-legislative acts 
(regulations, directives and decisions issued as either delegated or imple-
menting acts). This supposed ‘simplification’ is also problematic from the 
point of view of containing only unilateral types of act. In reality, and to an 
increasing extent, administrative action also takes place through non-unilat-
eral types of acts by way of multilateral agreements between various kinds of 
actors – both public and private – from the European and the national levels. 
Contractual – or at least consensual or negotiated – relations are at the core 
of the emerging administrative network used for implementing EU poli-
cies.5 Agreements are, for example, used widely in non-hierarchical network 
relations. Other than the instrument of inter-institutional agreements 
(Article 96 TFEU) and international agreements (Article 6 TFEU), agree-
ments as types of administrative acts themselves are acknowledged (as was 
the case under the EC Treaty) only indirectly, for example in provisions on 
Court responsibilities.6 
With respect to the other issue, it is important in this context to reflect 
on the new typology of acts influence the future of comitology and the role 
of agencies. For example, one of the central differences between the sepa-
rate categories of delegated acts and implementing acts under the Treaty of 
Lisbon is the mode of supervising the Commission with respect to delegated 
matters.7 In the case of delegated acts, the EP and Council can reserve the 
right either to revoke the delegation or to object to a proposed measure. 
Implementing acts would, on the other hand, be subject to newly defined 
comitology rules.8 The world of EU agencies, however, remain largely 
3  Article 90 TFEU. 
4  These are defined in Article 9 TFEU as acts for cases 
5  See H.C.H. Hofmann, Agreements in EU Law, 31 European Law Review [2006], 800-820.
6  See Articles 7 and 340 TFEU.
7  There are however hidden delegation issues. One is the possibility of sub-delegation is an 
additional result of the distinction between the two categories of delegated and implement-
ing acts in Articles 90 and 9 FEU. This possibility will arise especially in areas of broad 
delegation of legislative powers to the Commission under Article 90 FEU. The Commis-
sion may then be obliged (under Article 9 FEU) to sub-delegate to itself implement-
ing powers. This combination of provisions may thus result in a cascade of delegation of 
powers.
8  Supervision of implementing powers delegated to the Commission with the help of 
Comitology procedures has also to date been one of the major sources of inter-institutional 
conflict. The differences of Articles 90 and 9 TFEU with respect to political supervision 
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untouched by the new types of act – essentially ignored by the framers of the 
Lisbon Treaty. There is thus a continuously growing gap between the prolific 
creation of agencies in the EU and the conferral of powers to them on one 
hand, and their recognition in EU primary treaty law on the other hand.9 
As a consequence, agencies, despite being mentioned as potential sources of 
reviewable final acts in Article 63 () last sentence TFEU are not expressly 
mentioned as recipients of delegated powers for the issue of implementing 
acts. Such a delegation is explicitly reserved to the Commission or, excep-
tionally, to the Council, despite the existence of legislation which already 
increasingly transfers functions directly to agencies without the intermedi-
ary of the European Commission.30 With the absence of express reference to 
the delegation of powers to agencies, the Treaty of Lisbon (as well as already 
provided for in the Constitutional Treaty) reiterates the effect the Meroni 
doctrine has in written primary law,3 despite the fact that the ECJ has itself 
incrementally moved away from the doctrine in its more recent case law, 
of delegated and implementing acts can be interpreted as a between-the-lines commentary 
on the underlying developments of Europe’s increasingly integrating administration. 
9  D.Curtin, Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Agencies and Emerging Practices of Public 
Accountability, in: D. Geradin, R. Munoz and N. Petit (eds.), Regulation through agencies in 
the EU Elgar, (Cheltenham 005), 88-9; D. Fischer-Appelt, Agenturen der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, Duncker und Humblot (Berlin 999) 87-7. 
30  Examples for agencies which have received legislative delegation for single case and 
restricted regulatory decision-making powers are the Office for the Harmonisation of the 
Internal Market (OHIM) which is empowered to take legally binding decisions on the regis-
tration of Community trade marks and other Intellectual Property rights (see Article 43 (5) 
and 45 (6) of the Council Regulation 40/94 of 0 December 993 (OJ 994 L /) on the 
Community trademark (as amended in OJ 994 L 349/, OJ 995 L 303/). The Community 
Plant Variety Office (CPVO) has been delegated the power to adopt legally binding deci-
sions in relation on the registration of plant variety rights (Article 6 Council Regulation 
00/94 of  July 994 on Community plant varieties, OJ 994 L 7/ amended in OJ 
995 L 58/). Powers akin to regulatory powers have been granted to the European Air 
Safety Agency (EASA) to adopt decisions with regard to criteria for type certification and 
continued airworthiness of products, parts and appliances, and the environmental approval 
of products (Regulation (EC) 59/00 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 July 00 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European 
Aviation Safety Agency, OJ 00 L 40/).
3  In Meroni (Cases 9 and 0/56 Meroni v High Authority [957/58] ECR 33), the ECJ had 
considered as unlawful the delegation of discretionary powers to a private body contain-
ing the authorisation to take discretionary decisions which went beyond the delegation 
to clearly defined powers. See for a discussion of these agency related problems E. Chiti, 
Decentralisation and Integration in the Community Administration: A New Perspective on 
European Agencies, 0 European Law Journal (004) 40-438; P. Craig, EU Administrative 
Law Oxford University Press (Oxford 006) 60-64 and 84; M. Everson, Independent 
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based on the view that Meroni dealt only with a delegation of powers to a 
private body. As a consequence, the division between the constitutional 
provisions and the requirements of the architecture of the emerging Euro-
pean networked administration, including European agencies, will increase. 
Despite all this, delegation questions will inevitably continue to arise. 
Further, the questions of delegation and of the types of act in the context 
of administrative activity also need to take into account executive coopera-
tion which does result in final acts reviewable before Court. The various 
methods of governance often summarised as OMC (Open Method of Coop-
eration) are a case in point. The application of general principles of EU law to 
such methods in order to establish procedural guidelines and protect rights 
of parties involved provides a possible way of proceeding. Difficulties would 
arise with their enforcement though. The more informal a procedure, the 
less transparent and subject to control and review mechanisms it generally 
is.
These few examples show that the challenge of establishing a coherent 
approach to the delegation of implementing powers and to the procedures 
under which delegations can be made, as well as the potential for uncer-
tain or unsatisfactory outcomes remains important, complex and far from 
settled. Attempts in the Treaties intended to simplify the issue leave us not 
only with a complex array of types of acts and procedures, they also address 
neither the issue of integrated administration nor that of administrative 
action in forms other than unilateral acts. 
 .3 Reinforcing Accountability in Administrative Networks
Yet a third challenge for EU public law is the aspect of 
accountability of the actors involved in the administrative networks men-
tioned already. Accountability has both a political and a legal dimension.3 
Greatly simplified, the political dimension concerns attempts to ensure that 
the political will prevails while the legal dimension focuses on the issue of 
compliance with the rule of law in a broad sense, including legally defined 
structural and substantive elements.33 Both the legal and political dimen-
sions of accountability can be established by both ex post and ex ante mecha-
Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters?,  European Law Journal (995) 80-04; M. Koch, Die Exter-
nalisierungspolitik der Kommission, Nomos (Baden-Baden 004).
3  M. Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A conceptual framework, 3 European 
Law Journal [007], 447-468.
33  I.e. the principles of requirement of a legal basis, excluding ultra-vires activity and all 
activity violating fundamental rights and fundamental principles including the principles 
of good administration. This definition, as the further development of the ECJ’s famous 
definition of the Community as a ‘Community based on the rule of law’ in Les Verts (Case 
94/83 Les Verts [986] ECR 339, para 3). Among other goals, this approach is aimed at 
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nisms. Ex ante mechanisms broadly allow for the defining of tasks and 
for imposing conditions for carrying them out. They also include matters 
such as the choice of personnel entrusted with the tasks and the allocation 
of the budget for the purpose. For example, ex ante supervision within the 
public administration itself (administrative supervision of the administra-
tion) includes the structuring of decision-making processes in advance, the 
provision of information and interpretive assistance generally, guidance and 
advice in specific cases and measures which are in fact designed to ensure 
particular outcomes or at least outcomes within a particular range of pos-
sibilities. Ex post mechanisms provide inter alia for possible demands to 
justify actions already taken, as well as rewards for compliance or sanctions 
for non-compliance with the definitions of task and limits set ex ante.34 In 
that regard, accountability structures need to include a proper mix of ex ante 
and ex post administrative, political and judicial supervision and control. In 
order to be effective they need to include channels allowing input from indi-
viduals and civil society groups in order to set accountability mechanisms in 
motion.
In EU law, many different approaches to accountability mechanisms for 
network administration exist. The various structures of European agencies 
are, in fact, a perfect example of an experimental approach to the design 
of forms of accountability. These include: reporting obligations to the EP 
and Council; appointment and budgetary controls; and regular subjection 
of agencies to external review and evaluation. The latter are themselves 
intended to also take into account views of parties with an interest in the 
functioning of the agency. The means of achieving accountability are also 
comprised of internal complaint mechanisms designed for self-review of 
decisions such as boards of appeal. Others take the form of a sort of admin-
istrative control agency for certain types of matters, such as violations of 
individual rights. These include the matter of data secrecy through an inde-
pendent European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and financial respon-
sibility through OLAF (the Commission’s Office pour la lutte anti-fraude). 
These two have the right to intervene directly in on-going procedures, thus 
not requiring a control only ex post a final decision.
securing individual freedoms and rights within a system allowing for proper exercise of 
public power.
34  M. Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A conceptual framework, 3 European 
Law Journal [007], 447-468. The ECJ links this notion with the requirement to guarantee 
an institutional balance stating in case C-70/88 Parliament v Council [990] ECR I-04, 
para  that ‘[o]bservance of the institutional balance(…) requires that it should be possible 
to penalize any breach of that rule which may occur.’ The relation between these two actors 
can be hierarchic or can exist within networks. Ex ante and ex post functions may them-
selves be delegated and sub-delegated.
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When analysing the various accountability mechanisms which have been 
created in different contexts of network administration it should, however, 
not be forgotten that openness and transparency are key elements of the 
procedures. This allows for awareness of the criteria and access to the mate-
rial taken into account by actors within administrative networks and the allo-
cation of competences for individual steps for which the relevant actors will 
be held responsible. This is inter alia a key condition also for public scrutiny 
of, and participation in, the exercise of public power.
Developing a set of accountability mechanisms which can be applied 
generally as part of a transparent and visible system of control and super-
vision of network administration is one of the central challenges for EU 
administrative law in the future. 
 .4 General Procedural Rules for EU Administration?
This leads to a fourth challenge of EU administrative law: 
It can be asked whether a general set of administrative rules and principles 
applicable throughout the EU system could plausibly be established. Such a 
development could prove useful especially in the light of the lack of transpar-
ency, the diverse methodologies of accountability and generally the fluidity 
of EU administrative law techniques and structures. In fact, much of the 
EU’s administrative structures and administrative law are in a permanent 
state of development. Each separate policy area is, in effect, a field of experi-
ment. Moreover, the law is forever attempting to catch up with changing 
administrative reality, a feature EU administrative law shares with virtually 
any other area of law but one shared especially with national administrative 
law.35 In addition to this liability, there is very little coordination between the 
policy areas. Very few provisions and mechanisms exist in EU law which are 
applicable throughout the full range of policy areas, most being policy-spe-
cific. Amongst the few legal norms of general application are the Comitology 
Decision,36 Directives on data protection,37 the Financial Regulation,38 the 
35  F. Bignami, Foreword, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems [004] -0.
36  Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 3 July 987 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, [987] OJ L 97/33 and Council Deci-
sion 999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission, [999] OJ L 84/3. Decision 006/5/EC, OJ 006 L /. 
For a discussion of this pre-006 development, see C.F Bergström, Comitology: Delegation 
of Powers in the European Union and the Committee System (OUP, 005).
37  Regulation 45/00 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 December 000 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ 00 L 8/.
38  Council Regulation 605/00 of 5 June 00 on the Financial Regulation Applicable to 
the General Budget of the European Communities, OJ 00 L 48/ which replaced the 
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Regulation on so called Community ‘executive agencies’39 as well as Direc-
tives on access to information.40 Additional sources of general EU adminis-
trative law arise from general principles of law4 and fundamental rights,4 
which apply within the sphere of EU law irrespective of the specific law 
applicable to the procedure, whether national or European. 
However, such general EU administrative law, except for the Comitol-
ogy Decision, generally does not establish any specific procedural rules on 
supervision and review. Policy specific law generally leaves it to the Member 
States to establish the procedure as well as the conditions for supervision 
and judicial control of administrative action. The founding treaties did 
not provide for a legal framework for such an integration of administrative 
procedures and mechanisms. It has been due to the evolutionary and diversi-
fied development of the forms of integrated administration that has led to 
many new and unforeseen legal problems which, as noted above, often result 
from non-hierarchical, network-like structures and cooperative procedures 
for administration in the EU. 
One of the striking features of this development is that the evolution of 
integrated administration has not been subject to any systematic approach, 
whether through hard or soft law. There is no standard EU ‘administrative 
procedure act’ or similar code or legal framework horizontally applicable 
977 Financial Regulation (OJ 977 L 356/).
39  Council Regulation 58/003 of 9 December 00 laying down the statute for execu-
tive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community 
programmes, OJ 003 L /.
40  See for the EC, Regulation 049/00 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
May 00 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission docu-
ments, OJ 00 L 45/43.
4  General principles of law often include principles requiring standards of procedural justice 
in administrative procedures, such as the notions of proportionality, rights of defence and 
others. See for an overview: J. Schwarze Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht nd edition, Nomos 
(Baden-Baden 005); T. Tridimas General Principles of EU Law nd edition, Oxford Univer-
sity Press (Oxford 006); J. Jans, de Lange, S. Prechal, R. Widdershoven Europeanisation of 
Public Law Europa Law Publishing (Groningen 007).
4  Fundamental rights can be procedural, as Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU shows or substantive. All provisions which regulate activity within the scope of 
Community law need to be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the Community legal order. Generally see Case C-59/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn 
Children Ireland [99] ECR I-4685, para 3; Case C-99/95 Friedrich Kremzow v Austria 
[997] ECR I-69, para 5; Case C-76/0 Steffensen [003] ECR I-3735, para 70. The defini-
tion of the scope of Community law is widely defined in Case C-60/89, ERT-AE v DEP 
[99] ECR I-95, paras 4, 43.
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throughout the policy areas touched by European integration.43 Also, the 
doctrinal treatment of these matters of general EU administrative law is in 
its infancy. Only recently has there been a developing interest in research 
with respect to a more general approach to EU administrative law going 
beyond studying merely the general principles of law.44 
 .5 Composite Procedures
A fifth feature, bringing its own challenges, is that EU 
administrative law is in many important ways distinct from its national 
counterparts, most notably through the development of multiple forms of 
‘composite procedures.’ Composite procedures are multiple-step procedures 
with input from administrative actors from different jurisdictions. These 
cooperate either vertically (between EU institutions and bodies, on one 
hand, and Member States’ institutions and bodies, on the other), horizon-
tally (between various Member State institutions and bodies) or in triangu-
lar procedures (in which institutions from various Member States’ as well as 
EU institutions and bodies are involved). The final acts or decisions ema-
nating from such procedures are issued by a Member State body or an EU 
institution or body.45
Such composite procedures are made increasingly necessary by the 
complexity of regulatory demands, which often exceed the limits of compe-
tence of individual regulatory levels and individual Member States. The 
emergence of composite procedures involving vertical and horizontal 
administrative cooperation gives rise to many legal problems, especially 
for the protection of rights and the supervision of administrative action.46 
43  There is of course legitimate debate as to whether there is to date a legal basis for such an 
approach. Article 98 II TFEU would arguably create such a legal basis for a generalisable 
EU administrative law for implementation by EU institutions and bodies. 
44  J.-B. Auby, J. Dutheil de la Rochere (eds.) Droit Administratif Européen Bruylandt (Bruxelles 
007); M. P. Chiti, G. Greco (eds.) Trattato di diritto amministrativo comunitario Vol. I, II, 
Giuffrè, nd ed. (Milano 007); P. Craig EU Administrative Law Oxford University Press 
(Oxford 006); H.C.H. Hofmann, A. Türk (eds.), EU Administrative Governance, Elgar 
Publishing (Cheltenham 006); E. Schmidt-Assmann, B. Schöndorf-Haubold (eds.) Der 
Europäische Verwaltungsverbund Mohr (Tübingen 005).
45  The final decision, when issued by a Member State administration will often have ‘trans-
territorial’ effect, which have an effect beyond the territory of the issuing jurisdiction. See: 
H.C.H. Hofmann, Decision-Making in EU Administrative Law – The Problem of Compos-
ite Procedures, 6 Administrative Law Review [009 special edition] 199-221.
46  D. Curtin, Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account, 3 
European Law Journal [007], 53-54, at 540: ‘One of the main problems regarding the 
checks and balances under construction in the ‘undergrowth’ of legal and institutional 
practice is the chronic lack of transparency of the overall system. It is not that there is 
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Appropriate solutions to these problems might include the construction of a 
control network, that is, a network of accountability and supervision includ-
ing particularly the control of legality, maybe even a curial network.47 This 
seems especially necessary in the EU legal system, in which harmonisation 
of procedural law is undertaken not systematically but in bits and pieces 
throughout the highly diverse regulation of various substantive law provi-
sions.
 .6 Establishment and Use of Information 
Sixthly, in EU administrative law, information including 
its establishment and use, increasingly needs to be treated as an important 
topos of concern, and thus of legal research, in its own right. The reason 
is that the sophisticated complexity which EU administrative co-operation 
within networks has reached is based mainly on the generation, gather-
ing, compilation, handling, computation, management and distribution of 
information. Increasingly, information is the key input and commodity for 
decision-making through administrative cooperation in the EU. Composite 
procedures, referred to above, can themselves generally be reduced to steps, 
measures and decisions concerning the joint creation, use and sharing of 
information. Information is used in relation to many functions inter alia as 
a raw material for public decision-making, planning and steering activities. 
One of the central reasons for the importance of information in its own right 
is that the law concerning the establishing, compiling and use of informa-
tion is developing at an increasingly rapid pace in numerous policy areas, 
reflecting the nature, role, technological handling, economic, social and 
political relevance of information in practice. Next to policy-specific rules 
such as in areas of risk regulation, obviously general legal provisions can be 
found on access to data and on data protection. However, European criminal 
law, EU security policy, border protection and anti-terrorism measures as 
well as civil and regulatory law (for example, in the field of insurance) are 
also fast expanding their reach and range within data-oriented fields. 
The nature and the extent of the impact of the role of information and 
the accompanying developing law of information in the EU on the funda-
mental rights of the citizens is considerable. There is both a substantive and 
a procedural element relevant to understanding this aspect of the exercise 
of public powers in Europe. The substantive element concerns the estab-
lishment of joint rules and principles for the creation, exchange and use of 
information. Substantive rights of participation are necessary to ensure both 
no public accountability (…) it is rather that it is not visible and often not structured very 
clearly.’
47  The concept of a possible network of courts is further discussed below in the following 
chapter of this paper.
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that individuals do not merely become sources of administrative infor-
mation, but also that they be treated as individuals holding rights under 
European law. The procedural element concerns the establishment of rules 
and principles for composite decision-making in the EU so as to ensure that 
individuals can actually enforce such participation rights broadly defined.48 
These are essential elements for a modern EU legal system in which 
accountability of the exercise of public powers is guaranteed. 
	 2.7	 The	International	Setting	of	EU	Administrative	Activity
A seventh feature, linked to the network structure, is the 
international openness of the EU administrative system. This poses specific 
challenges to the legal framework of EU administrative activities and essen-
tially the understanding of what the EU itself is and where it and its legal 
system strictly ends. 
EU administration is subject to three basic elements or dimensions of 
internationalisation. The first element is the internationalisation of regula-
tory systems. European administrative activity is often the necessary result 
of obligations arising from international organisations. To these either the 
Member States are exclusively signatories, or, as it were in some cases of 
mixed agreements, also the EC (in future the EU) is member. These can 
be, for example, the UN,49 the WTO,50 or other organisations such as the 
Council of Europe, the ILO, NATO or the OECD. This international dimen-
sion adds to the complexity and difficulty of allocating responsibility since 
impulses for action may emanate from outside of the EU legal system. The 
second dimension of the internationalisation of EU administrative activities 
results from the fact that EU administrative networks often include non-EU 
participants such as third states and international NGOs. Finally, the third 
48  See with further detail on conceptual and legal philosophical considerations, see e.g.: 
J. Mendes, Participation and participation rights in EU law and governance, in: H.C.H. 
Hofmann, A. Türk (eds.) Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law: The Move to an Inte-
grated Administration, Elgar Publishing (Cheltenham 009) 57-87; J. Greenwood, Interest 
representation in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan (Houndmills, 003); P. Magnette, 
European governance and civic participation: beyond elitist citizenship?, 5 Political Studies 
[003], 44-60.
49  See e.g. the increasing police and secret service coordination activity at the UN level result-
ing in Case T-306/0 Ahmed Ali Yusuf [005] ECR II-3533; C-45/05 P and C-45/05 P Kadi 
and Al Barakaat [008] ECR I-nyr of 3 Sept. 008, in which the ECJ followed AG Maduro in 
providing for judicial review of EU measures implementing UN sanctions against individu-
als.
50  Especially with respect to enforcing obligations under agreements such as the GATT, 
GATS, TRIPS, SPS, TBT and SCM as well as panel and appellate body decisions establish-
ing the details of these obligations.
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dimension reflects the fact that not all EU Member States participate in a 
given policy and thus that cooperation between certain EU members begins 
or may persist through cooperation initiated through agreements under 
public international law.5 
These three dimensions are another indicator of the non-hierarchical, 
disaggregated state of administrative networks in the EU. They raise ques-
tions parallel to the external policy considerations from the constitutional 
perspective which need to be dealt with both in the context of ‘EU inter-
national administrative law’ and in what has become known as ‘global 
administrative law.’ The network character of administrative cooperation 
thus surpasses the territorial limits of the EU and its Member States. Such 
networks often in fact include non-EU actors. 
In this respect, EU international administrative law can be said to be 
completely underdeveloped. Thus far, the EU experience in international 
administrative law can be seen in a wide range of agreements by the 
Community and its agencies as well as by the EU. These govern external 
relations in many policy fields and contain commitments for regulatory 
cooperation as well as single-case mutual assistance. Many of the activities 
relate to information gathering and exchange and are thereby highly relevant 
to the rights of individuals. At the same time, the EC is actively involved 
in a plethora of international organisations and networks, many charged 
with administrative tasks. This participation requires the establishment of 
minimum standards of good administration in order to ensure its legitimacy 
from the standpoint of the EU/EC own principles.
This situation will not change by an eventual entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. In reality international networks play an ever increas-
ing role and yet from the perspective of legal theory they could so far be 
described as a ‘black hole’ relying on vague delegations within the legal basis 
of European agencies, as part of an experimental approach to new forms of 
governance in the EU. As already in the EU/EC treaties, under the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the external dimensions of individual policy areas remain largely 
implicit, relying on implied powers for their legal basis.5 What is more, all 
international agreements are to be concluded following the procedure of 
5  See for example the origins of the Shengen, Dublin and Prüm agreements.
5  M. Cremona, A Constitutional Basis for Effective External Action?, EUI Working Papers 
Law 006/30, page 3, para 5, who finds that In relation to energy policy, for example, and 
transport policy (the area from which AETR doctrine arose and which under the Treaty 
of Lisbon has been expressly excluded from the scope of common commercial policy), no 
express provision is made for external powers. The external dimension of energy policy is 
increasingly important (see for example Council Conclusions of 4 March 006 on a New 
Energy Policy for Europe; ‘An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests’, paper 
from Commission/SG/HR for the European Council, S60/06). On the other hand, in rela-
tion to environment policy and research and development, also areas of shared competence, 
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Article 8 TFEU (the slightly amended Article 300 EC).53 No mention is 
made, however, of international agreements concluded by the EU agencies, 
such as those used as the basis for information exchange and other coopera-
tion measures.
Given this activity, the achievement of an overarching legal framework is 
not made simpler by the diversity of conditions within the three pillars of the 
EU. Especially in the former second and third pillar matters, delegation of 
powers can be, for example, not only vertical from the Council to an agency 
but also horizontal involving delegations of powers from Member States 
directly to agencies. Europol is perhaps the best known example for this type 
of approach, having been initially set up by the Member States to coordinate 
certain national police activities. Europol has in recent years concluded an 
extensive range of international agreements with international organisa-
tions and third countries,54 but has done so on the basis of a rather shaky 
legal foundation for such activity. The same tendency, it might be argued, is 
visible in regard to the more traditional former first pillar matter, for exam-
ple in respect to the border agency FRONTEX. 
 3  Overarching Challenge: Accountability of 
Networks
These considerations provide an overview of some important 
challenges arising from an administrative perspective on EU public law. 
For a realistic understanding of EU administrative law, one must start by 
acknowledging the specific contextual factors of functional unity, organiza-
tional separation, and procedural cooperation which determine the develop-
ment of the EU administration. The notion of procedural cooperation has a 
particular importance in this. In reality such cooperation is often so inten-
sive that the cooperative procedures themselves in effect ‘coagulate’ so as to 
become administrative actors. Good examples for this have been comitology 
committees which have been legislatively transferred to agencies, for exam-
ple, the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) which evolved out of two comi-
tology committees. The key to the development of a public law framework 
for administrative action is, then, an understanding of the network-context 
of administrative law in which actors from various backgrounds, both public 
and private, cooperate in joint procedures. This network character is also 
relevant for understanding the difficult distinctions between the European 
the conclusion of international agreements is expressly mentioned in the context of interna-
tional cooperation (Article 9 (4) TFEU). 
53  Only with exceptions of some specific additional provisions relating to commercial policy 
agreements and international agreements in the field of monetary policy.
54  See: http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=agreements
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and the international levels in certain administrative procedures, due to 
many hybrid forms of cooperation. In the wake of this emerge far-reaching 
questions about the nature of the EU and its limits. Administrative law is 
a necessary framework for encapsulating and, where possible, generalising 
the solutions or methods constantly being developed as experimental forms 
within individual policy areas. A key issue here is the great potential — and 
great need — for simplification and a more systematic approach. Thus far 
in legal research, administrative law issues have been addressed mainly 
in the context of specific policy area-studies such as competition, state aid 
or regional and structural funds. Attention needs to be given to achieving 
a more comprehensively applicable law on administrative procedure and 
organisational form through greater standardization of structures, proce-
dures and methodology throughout the various EU policy fields.
European integration has, therefore, developed over time through the 
mechanism of a network of integrated executives for the creation and 
implementation of policies within the sphere of EU law. Rules and principles 
governing the cooperation itself have often not only been provided for in the 
Treaties, more often they have simply evolved out of institutional practice.55 
This difference between the formal legal order of the EU and the lived reality 
can be considered an organisational — or at least conceptual — ‘gap.’ The 
gap is one between the reality of the actors involved in creating and imple-
menting EU policies compared with the procedures and institutions as set 
out (albeit already as complex types of acts and procedures) in the found-
ing Treaties.56 The challenge for EU public law theory lies in developing 
approaches that take into account both the patent and latent realities.
The organisational gap referred to leads also to an ‘accountability gap’. 
The latter arises due to different degrees of integration within European 
structures of the key elements of what in, a traditional system of separa-
55  Institutional practice, however, does not generally allow deviations from positive provisions 
in the Treaties. Famously, the ECJ in Case C-5/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel v Köster [970] ECR 6, para 6, the ECJ had relied inter alia on consistent 
practice of the Community institutions to justify the legality of a comitology procedure. 
However, in its more recent case law, this reasoning stemming from public international 
law, has no longer been accepted. In C-33/06 Parliament v Council (refugee status) of 6 May 
008, [008] ECR I-nyr, paras 43-63 and C-93/00 Parliament v Council (beef labeling) [00] 
ECR I-09, paras 38-43 the Court stated that long established institutional practice (e.g. 
the practice to create derived legal bases providing for a different decision-making proce-
dure than that provided in the Treaty to be in violation of the principle of limited attribution 
of powers under Article 7 () EC) was irrelevant. 
56  D. Curtin, Mind the Gap: the Evolving EU Executive and the Constitution, Walter van Gerven 
Lectures, Europa Law Publishing (Groningen 004); J. Scott, D. Trubek, Mind the gap: law 
and new approaches to governance in the European Union, 8 European Law Journal [00], 
-8.
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tion of powers, would be referred to as the legislative, executive and judicial 
powers. On the European level, the high degree of integration of executive 
powers is often not matched by an equal level of integration of legislative and 
judicial powers.57 This leads to imbalances and problems of supervision and 
control of the executive. It is a consequence which has been deplored with 
respect to Member State executives: these have been able to become more 
powerful vis-à-vis their national parliaments due to an escape from political 
accountability at home through rule-making on the EU level.58 This prob-
lem has been somewhat addressed by strengthening of the EP and through 
effective judicial control over the operation of EU law by the ECJ. However, 
the important difference between an integrated executive and account-
ability systems is that, on the one hand, there is an integrated executive in 
which there is close cooperation in agenda setting, policy making and policy 
implementation. Integration there has become so intense that it is often not 
possible to discern the locus of responsibility for the final outcome. On the 
other hand, there is far less integration in the reality of political (parliamen-
tary) and judicial supervision and control of executive actors. This results 
in structural imbalances in regard to effective accountability. The account-
ability gap emerges, therefore, between the extent and intensity of executive 
integration and the capabilities of control over and supervision of the execu-
tive actors by other holders of public power.
This has important consequences not only for our understanding of the 
role of the EU and the Member States but also for the analysis of key aspects 
of the EU system, in particular the issue of accountability in the exercise of 
public power in Europe. The latter aspect is arguably the key challenge aris-
ing from the (partial) integration I have referred to. The question therefore is 
whether, in view of the evolution of integrated executives, forms of account-
ability have been or can be established with equivalent effect. It cannot be 
treated as a given that such accountability structures would automatically 
appear in a similar time frame or with comparable speed, not least because 
the highly integrated network system mentioned has itself developed in a 
non-coordinated, experimental way, pioneered in individual policy areas. 
57  Further explanations in: H.C.H. Hofmann and A. H. Türk, Legal challenges in EU 
administrative law by the move to an integrated administration, in: Legal Challenges in EU 
Administrative Law Elgar Publishing (Cheltenham 009) 355-380.
58  This is generally explained by the fact that conferral of powers from the national to the 
supranational sphere often affect or even undermine the separation of powers typically 
established within a state. Since it is generally the executive branch of government repre-
senting the state towards the outside, this branch of government gains powers through 
participation in the exercise of this power on the supranational level which nationally would 
have remained with the legislature. See with further considerations for the consequences 
of delegation e.g. D. Sarooshi, International Organisations and their Exercise of Sovereign 
Powers, Oxford University Press (Oxford 005) 5.
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seven challenges for eu administrative law
The key challenge facing EU public law is thus to align various options of ex 
ante and ex post modes of control and supervision of executive, parliamen-
tary and judicial character, to ensure both the transparent, controllable and 
effective exercise of public powers.59 Administrative law is an essential and 
highly important part of public law’s toolbox to achieve these goals.
59  Above, it was found that accountability can be considered from three different perspectives 
aligned to the classical separation of powers as executive supervision, political (parliamen-
tary) supervision and judicial supervision.

